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Abstrat: The OSGi Platform nds a growing interest in two dierent appliations
domains: embedded systems, and appliations servers. However, the seurity properties of
this platform are hardly studied, whih is likely to hinder its use in prodution systems.
This is all the more important that the dynami aspet of OSGi-based appliations, that
an be extended at runtime, make them vulnerable to maliious ode injetion.
We therefore perform a systemati audit of the OSGi platform so as to build a vul-
nerability atalog that intends to referene OSGi Vulnerabilities originating in the Core
Speiation, and in behaviors related to the use of the Java language. Implementation of
Standard Servies are not onsidered.
To support this audit, a Semi-formal Vulnerability Pattern is dened, that enables to
uniquely haraterize fundamental properties for eah vulnerability, to inlude verbose de-
sription in the pattern, to referene known seurity protetions, and to trak the imple-
mentation status of the proof-of-onept OSGi Bundles that exploit the vulnerability.
Based on the analysis of the atalog, a robust OSGi Platform is built, and reommenda-
tions are made to enhane the OSGi Speiations.
Key-words: OSGi
tm
Platform, Seurity, Dependability, Java, Hardened Exeution Plat-
form, Vulnerability Catalog
∗
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Vulnerabilités des Composants Java
-
Une Classiation Expérimentale
Dans le Cadre de la Plate-forme OSGi
Résumé : La plate-forme d'exéution OSGi renontre un intérêt grandissant dans deux
domaines d'appliations diérents: les systèmes embarqués, et les serveurs d'appliations.
Cependant, les propriétés de ette plate-forme relatives à la séurité ne sont que très peu
étudiées, e qui peut fortement freiner son adoption dans les systèmes industriels. Cei est
d'autant plus ritique que la possibilité d'extension dynamique à l'exéution oerte par la
plate-forme OSGi rend elle-i vulnérable à l'injetion de ode maliieux.
Nous eetuons un audit de l'environnement d'exéution OSGi, an de réer un atalogue
de vulnérabilités. Nous herhons à référener les vulnérabilités ausées par la spéiation
`Core', ou bien par la mahine virtuelle Java sous-jaente. Les autres éléments dénis par
OSGi, omme les servies standards, ne sont pas onsidérés.
An de mener à bien et audit, nous dénissons un Pattern de Vulnérabilité semi-formel,
qui permet de dérire les aratéristiques des vulnérabilités de manière unique, de donner
des informations omplémentaires, de référener les protetions existantes, et d'identier le
status de l'implémentation des Bundles OSGi de test qui démontrent haque vulnérabilité.
A partir de ette analyse, un plate-forme OSGi robuste est onstruite, et des reomman-
dations pour les spéiations OSGi sont données.
Mots-lés : Plate-forme OSGi
tm
, Séurité, Java, Plate-forme d'exéution renforée, Ca-
talogue de Vulnérabilités
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1 Introdution
The OSGi Platform, whih enables multi-appliation management over Java Virtual Ma-
hines, is urrently seeing a dramati inrease in its appliation domains. First targeted at
embedded systems suh as multimedia automotive devies, it has sine widespread in the
world of appliations, with the Elipse Integrated Development Environment, and then to
appliation servers, suh as IBM Websphere 6.1, or reent development with JBoss. Sun is
envisioning to integrate it in the Sun JVM, and several Java Speiation Request (JSR)
work groups have been set up on the subjet
1
.
However, target systems are likely to be highly networked ones, and seurity impliations
have so far been mostly overlooked. Atually, the runtime extensibility of appliations that is
supported by the OSGi platform open a brand new attak vetor: ode an be installed on the
y, and no mehanism urrently guarantees that this ode is not maliious. As OSGi-based
systems move from Open-Soure projets and losed embedded devies toward large-sale
systems, this weakness an turn into a major vulnerability, unless seurity impliations are
better understood. We therefore perform in this study a systemati analysis of vulnerabilities
that are implied by OSGi bundles, and propose adequate ounter-measures.
Up to now, Two omplementary mehanisms are used to enfore seurity in the ontext of
OSGi-based systems. The rst mehanism is bundle digital signature [OSG05, PF06℄, whih
guarantees that only bundles from trusted issuers are installed. This trust requirement
fores the issuer to publish only safe bundles, sine he will liable for any inident aused by
the ode he provides. The seond mehanism is based on Java permissions, that enable to
swith on or o some attak-prone features of the Java Virtual Mahine. These mehanisms
are mostly insuient to guarantee that systems are safe. First, knowing the identity of a
bundle issuer does not give guarantees related to the quality of its bundles. Seondly, most
implementations do not have a proper implementation of the digital signature mehanism:
they rely on the JVM built-in veriation mehanism, whih is not ompliant with OSGi
speiations [PF07℄. And, lastly, Java permissions an not be onsidered as a panaea,
sine they are usually not dynami, and have a great ost in term of funtionality, but also
in term of performane.
New methods and new seurity mehanisms therefore need to be dened to provide
hardened OSGi Platforms. We present in this report our ontribution to this problem,
by addressing several requirements. A method for analyzing the seurity properties of the
OSGi Platform is dened. It is based on a atalog of vulnerabilities, and an therefore be
ompleted when further knowledge relative to OSGi Vulnerabilities is gathered. Based on
the analysis of this atalog, OSGi spei vulnerabilities are identied, and a prototype is
built to show the seurity mehanisms that an be used. Reommendations for an evolution
of the speiation of the OSGi Core platform are proposed to enable the OSGi Community
to take advantage of this work.
This researh report is organized as follows. Works related to vulnerability harateri-
zation and analysis are presented in Setion 2. A denition of our Software Vulnerability
1
http://jp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=277,http://jp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=291
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Pattern is given in Setion 3: it haraterized the properties of an OSGi system that need
to be listed so as to support vulnerability analysis. The analysis of the vulnerability atalog
is then provided, and reommendation for building a hardened OSGi Platform is given in
Setion 4.
Complementary informations are to be found in the Appendies. In partiular, a pre-
sentation of the OSGi Platform is given in Appendix A; the formal expression of the Vul-
nerability Pattern we dened is given in Appendix C; the vulnerability atalog in given
in its integrality in Appendix D; and the spei implementations of attaks based on the
identied vulnerabilities are given in Appendix E.
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2 Charaterization of Vulnerabilities in Component-based
Systems
The lassiation of the seurity - and vulnerability - properties of systems is neessary to
omprehend their weaknesses and to make them more robust. We present here the eort
that have been done to establish a preise knowledge of what vulnerabilities are, how to
analyse them, and how to take advantage from them to improve the omputing systems.
First, the terms that are used to haraterize vulnerabilities are dened. Next, the
dislosure mehanisms for software aws are presented. And Vulnerability Patterns that
support vulnerability analysis are given.
2.1 Denitions
The lassiation of seurity properties is based on the distintion between attak, vulner-
ability, and aw. The related maliious ations an be prevented by the use of seurity
protetions, or ountermeasures. The denitions of these terms follow.
Seurity: the onurrent existene of a) availability for authorized users only, b) onden-
tiality, and ) integrity [AJB00℄.
Attaks: ations that attempt to defeat the expeted seurity status of a system.
Software vulnerability: an instane of an error in the speiation, development, or on-
guration of software suh that its exeution an violate the seurity poliy [Krs98℄.
Software Flaw: a aw is a harateristi of a software system that builds, when put to-
gether with other aws, a vulnerability. The more generi term of WIFF (Weaknesses,
Idiosynrasies, Faults, Flaws) is also used [MCJ05℄.
Seurity Protetion, or Mitigations, or Countermeasures or Avoidane strategies: meh-
anisms and tehniques that ontrol the aess of exeuting programs to stored infor-
mation [SS73℄ or to other programs.
Now that the neessary terms are dened, dislosure mehanisms are presented.
2.2 From Databases to Top-Vulnerability Lists
Vulnerability dislosure aims at providing users and designers informations that enable them
to trak the seurity status of their systems. Two main approahes exist: rst, vulnerabili-
ties of widespread appliations are published in Referene Vulnerability Information (RVI)
Databases so as to entralize this information; seondly, these vulnerabilities are lassied
aording to Top-Vulnerability Lists, that support a omprehensive views of potential weak-
nesses.
INRIA
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Referene Vulnerability Information (RVI) Databases Catalogs, Lists and Tax-
onomies are the favorite vetor for expressing the vulnerabilities that are identied in soft-
ware systems. The approah varies aording to the target of the vulnerability identiation
work. Extensive databases are meant to maintain up to date referenes on known software
vulnerabilities, so as to fore the system vendor to path the error before hakers an exploit
it. Taxonomies are partiularly used in researh works, whih foster to improve the knowl-
edge relative to the vulnerabilities. Their goal is to develop tools based on this taxonomies.
The drawbak of these systemati approahes - atalog and taxonomies - is that they are
not easy to remember, and are thus of limited usefulness for developers or ode auditor.
Several Top Vulnerability Lists have been proposed to solve this problem, and provide the
software professionals with onvenient pratial data.
The main existing referenes are vulnerability databases. They are also known under the
denomination of Rened Vulnerability Information (RVI) soures. Two main types of RVI
exists: the vulnerability mailing lists, and the vulnerability databases.
The main mailing lists are the following:
 Bugtraq, 1993 onwards (see http://msgs.seurepoint.om/bugtraq/),
 Vulnwath, 2002 onwards (see http://www.vulnwath.org/),
 Full Dislosure, 2002 onwards (see among others http://selists.org/).
The referene vulnerability databases are the following. They are meant to publish and
maintain referene lists of identied vulnerabilities.
 the CERT (Computer Emergeny Response Team) Database. It is based on the Com-
mon Language for Seurity Inidents [HL98℄
2
.
 the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) Database
3
.
 the CWE (Common Weaknesses Enumeration) Database. It is bounded with the
CWE, and aims at traking weaknesses and aws that have not yet turned out to be
exploitable for attakers
4
.
 the CIAC (Computer Inident Advisory Capability) Database
5
.
 the OSVDB, Open Soure Vulnerability Database
6
. It is entered at Open Soure
Produts.
Complementary Rened Vulnerability Informations Soures are the following organiza-
tions: SeuriTeam
7
, Paket Storm Seurity
8
, the Frenh Seurity Inident Response Team
9
, ISS X-Fore
10
, Seunia, and SeurityFous.
2
http://www.ert.org/
3
http://ve.mitre.org/
4
http://we.mitre.org/index.html
5
http://www.ia.org/ia/index.html
6
http://osvdb.org/
7
http://www.seuriteam.om/
8
http://paketstormseurity.nl/
9
http://www.frsirt.om/
10
http://xfore.iss.net/xfore/alerts
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The limitations of the RVIs is that they follow no stable poliy, whih makes omparison
between soures and between the item of a given soures diult [Chr06℄.
Top-Vulnerability Lists Sine atalogs are not that easy to remember, and therefore to
put into pratie, several `Top N' lists have been dened. The motivation for suh lists is
the reurrent drawbaks of other approahes: vulnerability atalogs do not provide a useful
overview of the identied vulnerabilities [Chr06℄.
Therefore, an alternative approah has been developed: to publish lists of prevalent
attak ategories. Their goal is to be used as reminder for developer or seurity analysts
[MG06℄, and to serve as referene for software produt haraterization, through integration
into seurity-based ode assessment tools [MCJ05℄. The most important of these vulnera-
bility lists are presented.
One lassiation of omputer seurity Intrusions is given by Lindqvist [LJ97℄ (see ap-
pendix B.1). It ontains external and hardware misuse, and several software misuse ases:
bypassing intended ontrol, ative and passive misuse of resoures, preparation for other
misuse ases.
The Plover lassiation
11
is an example of rationalization of Vulnerability atalogs to
support analysis. It is based on the MITRE CVE Database, and ontains 300 spei entries
that reet 1400 vulnerabilities identied in the CVE database. Its goal is to suppress re-
dundany from the original database, so as to enable sienti analysis, e.g. using statistial
approahes [Chr05℄.
The Nineteen Deadly Sins of software systems are dened by Mihael Howard, from
Mirosoft [HLV05℄ (see appendix B.3). They desribe the most ommon vulnerabilities that
are to be found in enterprise information systems. They onern Web based systems, as well
as the arhiteture of the information systems and the tehnologies involved.
The Open Web Appliation Seurity Projet (OWASP) maintains a TOP 10 of Web
Appliations vulnerabilities
12
(see the appendix B.4). It onerns input validation, data
storage, as well as onguration and error management. Another onsortium for Web Ap-
pliation seurity enforement, the WASC (Web Appliation Seurity Consortium), provides
its own threat lassiation
13
.)
A onvenient vulnerability list is provided by Gary MGraw, through the Seven King-
doms of software vulnerabilities [MG06℄ [TCM05℄. The number 7 is hosen to be easily
remembered, and eah entry is ompleted with Phyla i.e. preise example of the broader
ategories that are dened by the Kingdoms. The kingdoms are the following: Input Valida-
tion and representation, API abuse, Seurity Features, Time and state, error handling, ode
quality, enapsulation + environment (see the appendix B.5). This lassiation is targeted
at enterprise information systems.
The publiation of newly disovered vulnerabilities and of Top-Lists helps the prati-
tioner stay informed of the atual seurity risks of the system they use, but they provide
11
http://ve.mitre.org/dos/plover/
12
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Top_Ten_Projet
13
http://www.webappse.org/projets/threat/
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little support for systemati analysis. Vulnerability Patterns must be dened to formalize
vulnerability informations.
2.3 Vulnerability Patterns
The desriptive spirit of Design Pattern [Ale77℄, [GHJV94℄, [MM97℄, is well suited for ap-
pliation in the seurity elds, where the question of organization and exploitation of the
knowledge is entral to the protetion of systems - and not straightforward, if one judges
from the various approahes that are used. Two types of patterns are dened in the seurity
domain: Attak Patterns, and Vulnerability Patterns.
Attak Patterns represent potential attaks against a system. They model the preon-
ditions, proess and postonditions of the attak. They an be ombined with attak trees,
so as to automate the identiation of attaks that are atually build from simpler atomi
attaks [MEL01℄. An extensive presentation of the appliation of attak pattern is given in
the book by Markus Shumaher [Sh03℄. The use of Attak Patterns together with with
software arhiteture desription to identify vulnerabilities is desribed by Gegik [GW05℄.
The limitation of this approah is that the attaks must be modelized, but the system must
also be, whih makes this approah impratial, and often not realisti based on the atual
knowledge that is available on systems.
The Vulnerability Patterns are used in the atalog of vulnerabilities. They often ontain
a limited number of information that are meant to identify the vulnerability, but also to not
make it easily reprodueable without a reasonable amount of eort, to prevent lazy hakers
to exploit the vulnerability databases as a soure of ready-to-exploit attak referenes.
We list here the most wide-spread Vulnerability Patterns, along with the attribute they
ontain:
 Roky Hekman pattern
14
: Name, type, subtype, AKA, desription, more information;
 CERT (Computer Emergeny Response Team) pattern: name, date, soure, systems
aeted, overview, desription, qualitative impat, solution, referenes;
 CVE
15
(Common Vulnerability and Exposures) pattern: name, desription, status,
referene(s);
 CIAC
16
(US Department of Energy) pattern: identier, name, problem desription,
platform, damage, solution, vulnerability assessment, referenes.
These Vulnerability Patterns are quite simple ones. They have an informative goal, but
do not intend as other patterns do at supporting the reprodution of the vulnerability with
a minimum of eort. This approah makes sense relative to their use ontext - making users
and administrators aware of the existene of the aws - but are not suient to support
detailed analysis of the related vulnerabilities.
14
http://www.rokyh.net/
15
http://ve.mitre.org/
16
http://www.ia.org/ia/index.html
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So as to support the automation of the seurity proess, and to make vulnerability
analysis possible, it is neessary to put onstraints on the Vulnerability Patterns. This is
performed through the denition of taxonomies, whih provide a ne grain desription of
the properties of eah vulnerability.
Eah taxonomy should verify the properties of a valid taxonomy, as dened by [Krs98℄
and [HL98℄. These properties are the following: objetivity, determinism, repeatability,
speiity (disjuntion), observability.
The seminal work on vulnerability taxonomy has been performed by Abbott [ACD
+
75℄
and Bisbey [BH78℄. The aws are lassied by type of error (suh as inomplete Parameter
validation). This approah turns out not to support deterministi deisions, sine one aw
an often be lassied in several ategories aording to the ontext. To solve this prob-
lem, Landwehr [LBMC94℄ denes three fundamental types of taxonomies for vulnerabilities:
lassiation by genesis of the vulnerability, by time of introdution, and by loation (or
soure).
Moreover, vulnerabilities should be onsidered aording to spei onstraints or as-
sumptions, sine there existene most of the time depends on the properties of the envi-
ronment [Krs98℄. This assumptions make it neessary to rely on a well dened system
model. For generi omputing systems, suh a model is proposed by the Proess/Objet
Model [BAT06℄. This requirement makes it impossible for generi purpose databases to rely
on spei taxonomies. For instane, the Common Vulnerability Enumeration [BCHM99℄
projet has given up the use of taxonomies. An expliit system model must thus be available
to support vulnerability taxonomies, and therefore the possibility of seurity automation or
analysis.
Extensive disussions of vulnerability taxonomies an be found in [Krs98℄, [SH05℄, [WKP05℄.
The CWE (Common Weaknesses Enumeration) Projet maintains a web page with addi-
tional referenes, and a graphial representation of eah taxonomy
17
.
In this setion, fundamental onepts of vulnerability analysis have been introdued:
denitions have been given to provide a rm basis to work on, and the existing works in
the domain of vulnerability analysis have been presented. This work onerns Vulnerability
properties, whih are often presented under the form of a taxonomy, and Vulnerability
Patterns, whih gather the information onerning several properties in a formalized way.
Existing Properties and Patterns are not suient to desribe the vulnerabilities of
an OSGi Platform, for several reason: rst, they do not take expliitly into aount the
presene of a virtual mahine; seondly, they are usually targeted at monolithi systems,
whereas OSGi provides a high degree of modularity through the bundles and the dependeny
resolution. We therefore rst need to dene the properties of interest for an OSGi-based
System, as well as a suitable Pattern, before the atual vulnerabilities of the platform an
be analyzed.
17
http://we.mitre.org/about/soures.html
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3 The Semi-formal Software Vulnerability Pattern
The goal of this study is to identify and to haraterize the vulnerabilities of the OSGi
platform, whih is introdued in the Appendix A. This haraterization is to be done with
a set of spei properties, and organized in a semi-formal Vulnerability Pattern. Existing
referenes are not suient to desribe the vulnerabilities of the OSGi Platform: neither
virtualization nor omponentization, that are provided in the ontext of OSGi, are taken
into aount. Moreover, we want our Vulnerability Pattern to provide us with enough
information to path them or build suitable seurity mehanism, whih is not the ase in
the literature.
The properties of interested that are traked are taken from existing software seurity
taxonomies. We add a new entry, the `Consequene Desription', that aims at evaluating
the seriousness of the vulnerability. The Pattern is made up of four parts:
 a Referene, for rapid onsultation,
 a Desription part, for additional and potentially more verbose information,
 an Implementation part, to identify the test onditions of the vulnerability,
 a Protetion part, beause the objetive of identifying the vulnerability is to be able
to path them.
Our experimental proess is the following. First, known aws that an aet Java ode
[Blo01, BG05℄ have been identied, and their impat on an OSGi Platform has been tested.
Seondly, potentially dangerous mehanisms, suh as native ode exeution, have been se-
leted from related projets. The third soure of information in our quest for vulnerabilities
of OSGi bundles is the speiations of the elements that make up an OSGi platform: the
Java Virtual Mahine, and the OSGi platform itself. Several Java API let the ode aess
to the Virtual Mahine itself (e.g. the System or Runtime API), or are known to ause
the exeution hang (Threads). The behavior of the OSGi platform in the presene of mal-
formed or maliious bundles is not speied. We therefore review the various entities that
make up this exeution environment: the format of the bundle meta-data (Manifest File),
the registration of servies, the bundle management and fragment funtionalities. For eah
potential vulnerability, we implemented a maliious bundle. This makes possible to validate
the hypothesis, and to identify the onditions for eah attak. When protetions against
these attaks exist, they are validated through experiment. The attak bundles are tested
in the four main Open Soure implementations of OSGi, Felix, Knopersh, and Equinox,
and Conierge.
We fous on the behavior of the ore of the onsidered exeution environment, whih
omprises the JVM and the OSGi platform. We therefore do not onsider the manage-
ment tools for Java systems, suh as JMX, or JVM TI. JMX enables to manage a JVM
though ode exeuted inside it. JVM TI is a C library that makes full ontrol over the
JVM possible through a third party program, whih an then aess the available threads,
provides an extensive debugging of the platform, and ontrol the JVM state. Seondly,
the OSGi bundles ommuniate through servies they publish inside the framework. A-
ording to the type of data they handle, these servies an be subjet to spei vul-
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nerabilities. A list of Servie-Level vulnerabilities is given by the Findbugs referene list
(http://ndbugs.soureforge.net/bugDesriptions.html, `Maliious Code Vulnerability' at-
egory). Lastly, the OSGi speiation denes a bunh of standard servies (HTTP, devie,
servie wiring, UPnP servies, et.). We do not onsider these servies either.
A Vulnerability Pattern is dened to normalize the information gathered relative to eah
vulnerability (see setion 3.1). The taxonomies for eah properties of interest are given and
explained in setion 3.2. An example is given in setion 3.3 to highlight the information
provided by the Vulnerability Pattern.
3.1 The Struture of the Semi-formal Vulnerability Pattern
The harateristis of interest to desribe the vulnerabilities of a software system need to be
gathered in a oherent set that ontains all the informations that are useful to understand and
prevent these vulnerabilities. We therefore dene a `Semi-formal Vulnerability Pattern' that
is similar to the `Attak Patterns' [MEL01℄. On the opposite of this latter, the Vulnerability
Pattern is entered around the identied vulnerability, so as to make their orretion easy.
Existing vulnerability patterns, whih are presented in the setion 2, an not be reused as-is,
sine they provide not enough details for our purpose.
The Vulnerability Pattern is ompound of following informations. Its formal expression
is given in the Apendix C.
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: The desriptive name of the vulnerability
 Identier: a unique identier for eah vulnerability. In our atalog, the identier is
built out of the atalog identier, the abbreviation of the soure entity, and the number
ID of the vulnerability in the atalog for the related soure entity.
 Origin: The bibliographi referene of the vulnerability.
 Loation of Exploit Code: Where the ode that performs the attak is loated in
the maliious Bundle (see Figure 1).
 Soure: the entity in the exeution platform that is the soure of the vulnerability,
along with the exat aw or funtionality ausing it.
 Target: the target of the attak that an be performed through the vulnerability, i.e.
the vitim of the attak (see gure 3).
 Consequene Type: the type of onsequene of an attak exploiting this vulnerability
(see gure 4).
 Time of Introdution: the Life Cyle phase where the vulnerability is introdued.
Corretive measures an be taken at this time. Seurity measures an be taken in
subsequent phases so as to prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability (see gure 5).
 Time of Exploit: the life-yle phase where the vulnerability an be exploited (see
gure 6). This is the last phase where seurity measures an be undertaken.
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Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: a desription of the attak
 Preonditions: properties if the systems that must be true so as to make the ex-
ploitation of the vulnerability possible.
 Attak Proess: desription of the proess of exploitation of the vulnerability.
 Consequene Desription: more information relative to the onsequenes of an
attak using this vulnerability.
 See also: other vulnerabilities based on similar attak soures.
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: the referene of the implementation ode (i.e. the name of the
maliious OSGi bundle.)
 Conerned OSGi Prole: the OSGi prole(s) where this vulnerability exists.
 Date: the date of the reation of the Vulnerability Pattern (for referene)
 Test Coverage: the perentage of the known implementations of the vulnerability
that have been implemented in a test bundle. The identied implementations for the
main attaks are given in the Appendix E.
 Tested on: the OSGi Platform Implementations for whih this vulnerability have
been tested.
Protetion
 Existing mehanisms: available protetions to prevent this vulnerability from being
exploited.
 Life-yle enforement point: the life-yle phase where the protetion mehanisms
must be enfored.
 Potential mehanisms: protetions that ould be developed so as to prevent this
vulnerability from being exploited.
 Attak Prevention: the measures that an be taken to prevent an attak based on
this vulnerability to be fullled, even if it is launhed.
 Reation: the orretion ation that an be taken to reover from a suessful attak.
3.2 Vulnerability Taxonomies for OSGi-based Systems
Before analyzing eah vulnerability, it is neessary to identify the properties of interest
that need to be haraterized. Moreover, the potential values for eah property should be
identied, and build a properly dened taxonomy. Following aspets need to be onsidered:
the referene of the attak bundle implementation that takes advantage of the vulnerability,
the life-yle harateristis of the vulnerability, so as to know when the vulnerability is
introdued, and when it is exploited, and the existing and potential seurity mehanisms.
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The properties we seleted to be inluded in the vulnerability pattern are thus the fol-
lowing:
 the referene of the vulnerability pattern (to identify the ode, and the ondition of
the experiments),
 the loation of the maliious ode,
 the soure of the aw(s) in the system (and the spei aw(s) and/or the dangerous
funtionality(ies)),
 the target of attaks based on the vulnerability,
 the onsequenes of the related attak, and
 the time of introdution of the vulnerability,
 the time of exploitation of the vulnerability,
 the exiting protetions against this attak,
 the potential protetions against this attak.
The goal of these properties is to make the information explanatory, preditive [Krs98℄,
but also useful [WKP05℄. Explanatory, beause the vulnerability should be intuitively un-
derstood by the persons who onsult the vulnerability atalog we propose, even with little
previous knowledge of the OSGi Platform. Preditive, beause the potential values of eah
harateristi should over the whole eld of possible options, or to explain why some are not
onerned. Useful, beause the objetive of a vulnerability atalog is to highlight the seu-
rity requirements of the platform under study. The onlusions of the analysis is presented
in the setion 4.
For eah property, a taxonomy is dened, that ontains the values this property an take.
Two approahes are used to dene this taxonomy. It is either dened a priori, i.e. before the
atalog is ompleted, or a posteriori, with data that are identied during the experiments.
We now present the taxonomy for eah of the properties of interest.
The rst two properties of interest are the Loation of the maliious ode and the soure
of the vulnerability. The loation onerns the plae in the attak bundle where the attak
`payload' is loated. The soure indiates whih entity in the exeution environment is
responsible for the vulnerability, i.e. for the system behavior that opens the door to the
attak.
Figure 1 shows the potential loations of maliious ode inside a malevolent bundle. The
maliious ode an be loated in the arhive struture (suh as arhive oversize, or a de-
ompression bomb), in the manifest (suh as dupliate imports, whih make the installation
abord), or in the bundle Ativator (is this latter is hanging). It an also be loated in the
appliative ode of the bundle, being native ode, Java ode, the Java APIs, or the OSGi
API. The maliious ode an also be loated in fragment, whih are spei bundle types.
The atual soures of vulnerabilities math the dierent Layers that are dened by the
OSGi Speiation, along with the Bundle Repository lient whih enables installation from
remote bundles, and various ode properties suh as Servies, the JVM APIs, or the algo-
rithmi properties of the programs. They are shown in Figure 2.
Figure 3 shows the potential targets of attaks against an OSGi Platform. These targets
an be either the whole platform, or spei OSGi Elements. Attaks against the whole
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Figure 1: Potential Loations of maliious Code in a Bundle
Figure 2: Vulnerability Soures in an OSGi-based System
Platform an for instane result in omplete unavailability if this latter. The vitim OSGi
Elements an be the Platform Management Utility, whih makes it possible for the user to
ontrol the life-yle of bundles (the ativator an hang), the bundle itself (whih an be
started or stopped), Servies (whih an suer from yles) or pakages (for instane, stati
data that is by default not aessible ould be modied through Bundle Fragments).
Figure 4 shows the potential onsequenes of an attak against an OSGi Platform. Three
types of onsequenes are identied: Unavailability, Performane Breakdown, and Undue
Aess. Unavailability an be ause by stopping the platform; Performane Breakdown an
be the result of an innite loop; and Undue Aess an be performed through Fragments or
through Reetion over Servies.
Figure 5 shows the atual introdution time of the vulnerabilities. The introdution time
an be as early as the design and implementation of the platform (when the aw originates in
the platform), or be the development time, the generation of the Meta-data of the bundles,
the digital signature of the bundle, the installation, or even the publiation and resolution
of servies.
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Figure 3: Potential Targets of Attaks against an OSGi Platform
Figure 4: Consequenes of the Vulnerabilities of the OSGi Platform
Figure 5: Introdution Time for the identied aws
The taxonomy for Time of Exploit of the vulnerability is represented in gure 6. This
time of exploit onerns neessarily the Life-Cyle steps inside the exeution platform. They
an therefore be: the download, installation, Bundle start (if the vulnerability is present
in the bundle ativator) or exeution time (either through servie all, or through use of
exported pakages).
The existing protetions against attaks based on the identied vulnerability are the
following: only runtime exeution permissions, either at the JVM level or at the OSGi
Platform level, are urrently available to protet an OSGi Platform from hakers. We
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Figure 6: Exploit Time for the identied Flaws
propose our own implementation of the OSGi Bundle Digital Signature validation proess,
whih is part of the OSGi Seurity Layer.
 Java Permissions,
 OSGi Permissions (in partiular AdminPermission),
 SFelix implementation of the Bundle Digital Signature Validation.
The properties of interest that haraterize a vulnerability have been presented. Next
paragraph gives the full Vulnerability Pattern that is based on these properties, and adapted
for better omprehension.
3.3 A Vulnerability Example: `Management Utility Freezing - In-
nite Loop'
So as to highlight the role of the dened Vulnerability Pattern, we now present an example
of vulnerability; the `Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop' vulnerability. The whole
vulnerability atalog is given in the Appendix D. This vulnerability onsists in the presene
of an innite Loop in the ativator of a given Bundle, whih auses the platform management
tool (often an OSGi shell) to freeze. The presene of innite loops as a vulnerability is given
by Blooh is `Java Puzzlers - Traps, Pitfalls and Corner Cases', puzzlers 26 to 33 [BG05℄.
The mathing Pattern is rst given, and then explained.
The Vulnerability Pattern
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop
 Extends: Innite Loop in Method Call
 Identier: Mb.osgi.4
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Ativator
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No safe Bundle Start)
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 Target: OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown; Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Bundle Start
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: An innite loop is exeuted in the Bundle Ativator
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: An innite loop is exeuted in the Bundle Ativator
 Consequene Desription: Blok the OSGi Management entity (the felix, equinox
or knopersh shell; when launhed in the KF graphial interfae, the shell remain
available but the GUI is frozen). Beause of the innite loop, most CPU resoure is
onsumed
 See Also: CPU Load Injetion, Innite Loop in Method Call, Stand Alone Innite
Loop, Hanging Thread
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -
CPU ; OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Startup Proess (launh the bundle a-
tivator in a separate thread to prevent startup hanging)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.inniteloopinmethodall-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-24
 Test Coverage: 10%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge
 Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
Details of the Vulnerability Pattern The `Management Utility Freezing - Innite
Loop' is referened under the identier `mb.osgi.4', whih means `maliious bundle ata-
log - originates in the OSGi Platform itself - number 4. This vulnerability is an extension
of the `Innite Loop in Method Call' one. It has been identied in the frame of the researh
projet `Maliious Bundles' of the INRIA Ares Team..
The loation of the maliious ode that performs the attak is the Bundle Ativator.
Its soure is the Life-Cyle Layer of the OSGi Platform, whih is not robust against suh a
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vulnerability. Its target is the Platform Management Utility, whih an be either the OSGi
shell or a graphial interfae suh as the Knopersh GUI. This vulnerability has a two-fold
onsequene: the method does not return, so that the aller also freezes; and the innite
loop onsumes most of the available CPU, whih auses the existing servies to suer from
a serious performane breakdown.
This vulnerability is introdued during development, and exploited at bundle start time.
Related Vulnerability Patterns are `Management Utility Freezing - Hanging Thread', that
also targets the Management Utility, `Innite Loop in Method Call', `CPU Load Injetion',
`Stand-alone Innite Loop' that have the same onsequene of performane breakdown, and
the `Hanging Thread', that also freezes the alling thread.
No spei protetion urrently exists. Two potential solutions have been identied. The
rst onsists in launhing every Bundle Ativator in a new Thread, so as not to blok the
aller if the ativator hangs. The seond solution would enable to prevent invalid algorithms
to be exeuted: stati ode analysis tehniques suh as Proof Carrying Code or similar
approahes [Ne97℄ an provide formal proves of ode wellformedness.
Its referene implementation is available in the OSGi bundle named `fr.inria.ares.innite-
loopinmethodall-0.1.jar', referened the 2006-08-24. The test overage is 10 %, sine ten
types of innite loops have been identied (see the appendix E), and only one has been
implemented. The test bundle have been tested on the following implementations of the
OSGi platform: Felix, Equinox, Knopersh, and Conierge. The only robust Platform is
our SFelix Platform, whih is a prototype meant to enhane to urrent Felix implementation.
This example highlights the informations that an be found in eah Vulnerability Pat-
terns. The information related to the other vulnerabilities is given under the form of pat-
terns, to provide a quik overview of the harateristis, and to make analysis possible. The
atalog of the vulnerability patterns is presented in the setion D. The setion 4 presents
the analysis of this atalog, and the seurity requirements an an be dedued from it.
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4 Requirements for seure OSGi Systems
The analysis of the Vulnerability Patterns we presented in the atalog provides guidelines
for programming seure OSGi-based systems. The objetive here is two fold. First, the
weaknesses of the OSGi Platform are to be identied, so as to provide a framework for
the evolution of its speiation. Seondly, these weaknesses are to be made available in a
developer-ompliant way, so that programmers an refer to them to verify that their system
do not open the way to known attaks: the Seven Deadly Sins of the OSGi R4 Platform are
therefore dened.
These guidelines are - o ourse - based on the atalog at the moment of its publiation,
and an therefore evolve in the future, when new vulnerabilities will be disovered, or when
new part of OSGi systems will be onsidered. Atually, the management tools suh as
JVMTI, and the OSGi standard servies are not onsidered, and an be the soure for new
vulnerabilities.
This setion is organized as follows. Subsetion 4.1 presents the analysis of the atalog
through statistis related to the signiant properties of the vulnerabilities. Subsetion 4.2
presents the Seurity Requirements for a hardened OSGi Platform. Lastly, Subsetion 4.3
gives a series of reommendation for the OSGi Speiation, in order to make the platform
more robust.
4.1 Catalog Analysis
The analysis of the identied Vulnerability Patterns provides quantitative data relative to
these vulnerabilities. This subsetion provides a summary of the signiant properties that
haraterize a vulnerability in an OSGi Exeution Environment. We use the term OSGi
Exeution Environment to desribe an exeution platform running OSGi on top of a
JVM. This denomination highlights the fat that not all vulnerabilities are bound to the
OSGi speiation itself, but an also originate in other parts of the system.
First, quantitative results relative to the vulnerability soures, funtions, aws, as well
as the identied attak targets are given. Next, a summary of the vulnerabilities for eah
tested OSGi Platform implementation is presented.
Figure 7 shows the soure entity of the identied vulnerabilities. The most important
soure is the Java API, whih auses the bigger part of the vulnerabilities. Next, the
Appliation Code properties, the OSGi Life-Cyle Layer and the OSGi Module Layer also
generate an important number of vulnerabilities. Next omes the Java Runtime API, whih
is partiularly sensitive, and the OSGi Servie Layer. The Operating System and the Bundle
Repository Client must also be onsidered as potential soure of vulnerabilities, even though
their impat is more marginal.
Figure 8 shows the ardinality of the identied dangerous funtions. First ome the
OSGi Bundle Faility, and the Java APIs Reetion, ClassLoader, and Thread. Next, the
bundle management, the Java File API and the opportunity of exeuting native ode open
the way to abuses. Several other funtions prove to be dangerous: the Runtime.halt() and
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Figure 7: Entities that are Soure of the vulnerabilities
the System.exit() methods, the lak of ontrol on method parameters, and the kill utility at
the OS level whih an be used to shut the platform down.
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Figure 8: Funtions that prove to be dangerous in the ontext of an OSGi Platform
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Figure 9 shows the ardinality of the aws of a Java-based exeution environment with
the OSGi Platform. The most important aw is the lak of algorithm safety in the Java
language. Next ome several properties of the OSGi platforms, suh as the lak of safe-default
bundle meta-data handling during the dependeny resolution phase, the lak of ontrol on
the servie registration proess, and the lak of robustness of the bundle start mehanism,
whih heavily relies on the validity of the bundle ativators. Several other puntual aws
have been identied: data of uninstalled bundles is often kept on the disk spae, being not
aessible, no dependeny ontrol is performed at the servie level, the proess of Digital
Signature validation is sometimes not ompliant with the OSGi R4 Speiations, and the
bundle arhive is never heked for size or validity, whih provides no protetion against
deompression bombs or large les, in partiular in resoure-onstraint environments.
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No Check of Size of Loaded Bundles
Source Flaw
Figure 9: Flaws in an OSGi Exeution Environment
Figure 10 shows the target of attaks against an OSGi exeution environment. The
entity that is the rst target of the identied attaks is the platform. This means that most
of the identied attak an easily prevent all servies on the platform the be exeuted in
a satisfatorily manner. OSGi spei elements, suh as pakages, Bundles or servies are
other frequent targets. Lastly, the Platform Management Utility an also be targeted, whih
would not prevent the platform to provide existing servies, but would prevent any evolution
of these servies - as well as the removal of the maliious bundle.
The table 1 shows a summary of the properties of the OSGi Platform implementa-
tions under study. The onsidered platforms are the main Open Soure Projets: Felix
18
,
18
http://wiki.apahe.org/FELIX/index.html
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Figure 10: Targets of Attaks against an OSGi Exeution environment
Knopersh
19
, Elipse Equinox
20
, and Conierge
21
. For omparison, we also provide the
data related to SFelix, whih is the Hardened OSGi Platform we develop. It is based on the
Felix Platform 0.8.0.
Most Open Soure OSGi Platforms are very fragile regarding the set of vulnerability
we identied. Equinox proves to have slightly better results than the other ones. SFelix
urrently does not intend to provide protetions against all the identied vulnerabilities,
but only to provide a rst enhanement of urrent implementations.
The result of our analysis have been presented for the properties that haraterize vulner-
abilities of an OSGi Platform: Loation of the maliious payload in Bundles, Vulnerability
Soure, Flaws and dangerous Funtions, as well as the identied Attak Targets. It is now
possible to identify the requirement for a Hardened OSGi Platform.
4.2 Requirements for a Hardened OSGi Platform
The requirement for a Hardened OSGi Platform an be dedued from the atual and poten-
tial seurity mehanisms. The objetive is to highlight the seurity mehanisms that need to
be better exploited (for the existing ones), and the ones that need to be developed (for the
potential ones). Priorities an be set aording to the type of target and onsequenes of the
19
http://www.knopersh.org/
20
http://www.elipse.org/equinox/
21
http://onierge.soureforge.net/
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Vulnerability Felix Knopersh Equinox Conierge SFelix Any with
Java Per-
missions
Exponential Objet Creation V V V V V -
Exessive Size of Manifest File V V R V R -
Aess Proteted Pakage through
split Pakages
V V V - V R
Freezing Numerous Servie Regis-
tration
- - - V - -
Big File Creator V V V V V R
Management Utility Freezing -
Thread Hanging
V V V V R -
Erroneous values of Manifest at-
tributes
V V V V V -
Invalid Digital Signature Valida-
tion
V - - - R -
Cyle Between Servies V V V V V -
Hanging Thread V V V V V -
Management Utility Freezing - In-
nite Loop
V V V V R -
Fragment Substitution V V V - V R
Numerous Servie Registration V V V V R -
Sleeping Bundle V V V V V -
Code Observer V V V - V R
Reursive Thread Creation V V V V V -
Dupliate Pakage Import V V R R R -
Memory Load Injetion V V V V V -
Innite Loop in Method Call V V V V V -
Runtime.halt V V V V V R
CPU Load Injetion V V V V V R
System.exit V V V V V R
Runtime.exe.kill V V V V V R
Component Data Modier V V V V V R
Stand Alone Innite Loop V V V V V -
Exeute Hidden Classes V V V - V R
Pirat Bundle Manager V V V V V R
Big Component Installer - - - - R -
Launh a Hidden Bundle V V V V V R
Zombie Data V R R V R -
Deompression Bomb - - - - - -
Hidden Method Launher V V V V V R
V: Platform is Vulnerable; R: Platform is Robust; - : not relevant
Table 1: Vulnerabilities for the main Open Soure OSGi Platforms
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attaks: it is in any ase worth preventing an attak that makes the whole platform unavail-
able, but it may be less important to prevent attaks that provoke only the unavailability
of the maliious bundle itself.
Figure 11 shows the ardinality of the atual protetion mehanisms. Most of the vul-
nerabilities an be prevented by Java Permissions. However, an important number of them
urrently have no assoiated protetions. The OSGi Admin Permission and the SFelix im-
plementation of the OSGi Seurity Layer (Digital Signature Validation part) aount eah
for one vulnerability.
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Figure 11: Atual Protetion Mehanisms
The Figure 12 shows the potential protetions identied to protet an OSGi Platform
against the onsidered attaks. This potential protetions are o ourse only set as hypothe-
ses: as long as no implementation is available, it is not possible to assert that no speial
ase or hard-to-trak false positives and negatives dot not our if the propose tehnique
is used. The most promising approah seems to be stati ode analysis, that would help
trak both dangerous alls without heavyweight permissions and unsafe algorithms. The
OSGi Platform itself would take benet of several minor modiations: better handling of
ill-formed meta-data, safe startup proess for bundles, better ontrol of servie publiation.
Some of these mehanisms have been experiened in the SFelix Platform, and prove to be
easy to implement. Also, resoure ontrol and isolation mehanisms (CPU, Memory, disk
spae) would make the support of multi-proesses safer.
The potential protetion mehanism represent the element that are worth an impor-
tant development eort. However, they do not show the relative priority of the seurity
mehanisms. Urgent seurity mehanisms are the ones that prevent attaks with serious
onsequenes - for instane platform unavailability - to be performed, or the ones that are
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Figure 12: Cardinality for eah potential Seurity Mehanisms for the OSGi platform
required to make the use of existing mehanisms eient and onvenient for developers.
Consequently, the priority is to be set on following protetion mehanisms:
 Protetion of Attaks targeted at the whole Platform (see Figure 10), and that impair
the availability or the performane of all exeuted bundles simultaneously,
 Protetion against silent attaks: lassial aess ontrol mehanisms are required
inside the OSGi Platform, to support mutually untrustful bundles,
 tools are required to take advantages of existing mehanisms: for instane, Permission
are supported, but urrently extremely unonvenient to set and manage.
We presented the requirement for developing a Hardened OSGi Platform by identifying
the best promising potential seurity mehanisms as well as the most urgent tools for pre-
venting serious attaks, or taking advantage of existing protetions. However, developers
require ready-to-use guidelines to take advantage of the knowledge we gathered in these
study: in the absene of available tools, they have to take are by themselves that the ode
they produe is safe from the known vulnerabilities.
4.3 Reommendations for a Hardened Exeution Environment
Hardening the Speiations of the OSGi Platform Based on the identied vulner-
ability of the OSGi Platform, we propose following reommendation for an enhaned OSGi
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Platform. These reommendation do not pretend to solve every identied problems, but
intend to make the ommunity aware of the easy hanges that an be made to the OSGi
Speiation so as to prevent avoidable aws.
These reommendations are validated by the Platform SFelix version 0.2, whih is a
robust extension to the Felix 0.8.0 implementation of the OSGi Platform.
Following improvement to the OSGi Release 4 Speiation should be made:
 Bundle Installation Proess: a maximum storage size for bundle arhives is set.
Alternatively, a maximum storage size for all data stored on the loal disk is set
(Bundle Arhives and les reated by the bundles); OSGi R4 par. 4.3.3.
 Bundle Uninstallation Proess: remove the data on the loal bundle lesystem
when a bundle is uninstalled (and not when the platform is stopped); OSGi R4 par.
4.3.8.
 Bundle Signature Validation Proess: the digital signature must be heked at
installed time. It must not rely on the Java built-in validation mehanism, sine this
latter is not ompliant with the OSGi R4 Speiations [PF07℄; OSGi R4, Paragraph
2.3.
 Bundle Dependeny Resolution Proess: do not rejet dupliate imports. just
ignore them; OSGi R4 par. 3.5.4.
 Bundle Start Proess: launh the Bundle Ativator in a separate thread; OSGi R4
par. 4.3.5.
 OSGi Servie Registration: set a Platform Property that expliitly limits the
number of registered servies (default ould be 50); OSGi R4 par. 5.2.3.
 Bundle Download: when a bundle download faility is available, the total size of the
bundles to installed should be heked immediately after the dependeny resolution
proess. The bundles should be installed only if the required storage is available.
To support this modiations of the OSGi R4 speiations, following hanges have been
applied to the API:
 In the Class BundleContext, a method `getAvailableStorage()' is dened,
 A property `osgi.storage.max' is dened, that is set in the property onguration le
of the OSGi framework.
 In the lass org.osgi.servie.obr.Resoure, a method `getSize()' is dened. This method
relies on the `size' entry of the bundle meta-data representation (usually a XML le).
In addition to these simple enhanement, more researh work is required in order to
dene proper solution to the identied vulnerabilities. The most important ones are the
following:
 Stati Code Analysis for Java,
 Convenient Permission Management for Java and OSGi,
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 Resoure isolation in omponent systems,
 Mandatory Servie Management.
Through this study, we identied both tehnial requirements for enhanement of the
OSGi R4 Speiations, and neessary researh work that is neessary to protet the OSGi
Platform.
Hardening the Speiations of the Java Virtual Mahine Some safety require-
ments have also been identied at the Virtual Mahine Level.
The aws that have been identied in the Sun Java Virtual Mahine version 1.6 are the
following:
 the Java Permission `exitVM' appears not to be eetive,
 the presene of a manifest with a huge size in a loaded Jar le introdues a dramati
slowdown of the JVM when the arhive Manifest is extrated. Our implementation
shows that a simple path an orret this matter of fat.
A aw has also been identied in the Gnu Classpath, whih is an open soure implemen-
tation of the Java lasses. Gnu Classpath is used in onjuntion with the JamVM Virtual
Mahine and targets resoure-limited devies:
 the presene of a manifest with a huge size in a loaded Jar le introdues a dramati
slowdown of the JVM when the orresponding JarFile Objet is reated, even though
the Manifest stays unused.
Requirements for programming seure OSGi Systems have been identied. First, a hard-
ened version of the OSGi Platform is needed to prevent most of the identied vulnerabilities
to be exploited. However, sine suh a platform will take time to develop and validate, a
pragmati approah is to be taken. First, tools should be developed to ease the management
of urrent seurity mehanisms suh as Java Permissions, whih are urrently not adapted to
dynami systems. Seondly, developers need to keep on mind what the OSGi vulnerabilities
are: this is made possible by the Seven Deadly Sins of the OSGi R4 Platform.
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5 Conlusions
The objetive of our study is to improve the dependability level of the OSGi platform, as
well as the knowledge that is available relative to the vulnerabilities of the OSGi Platform.
This improvement is ahieved through four omplementary ontributions. First, we dene
a method for analyzing the seurity status of software systems, based on a spei Software
Vulnerability Pattern. Seondly, we provide a vulnerability atalog that identied a set of
vulnerabilities, and the key properties for understanding - and preventing - them. Thirdly,
we developed a hardened OSGi Platform, SFelix v0.2
22
, that provides proof of onept
protetion mehanisms. And we issue a set of reommendations for the OSGi Speiations
that integrate these protetion mehanisms.
Our study is entered on the OSGi Core speiation, and does not take into aount
several mehanisms that are - or an be - often used together with OSGi platforms. In
partiular, management failities, suh as JVMTI, and with less impat JMX have not
been studied. OSGi standard servies are neither been onsidered, and servie engineering
questions have been negleted. These three elements will require further work, and will
likely enrih our vulnerability atalog.
A side-eet ahievement of our study is to preisely identify the requirements in term
of researh and development, so as to provide OSGi platform that are atually robust,
and not just partially hardened. Stati Code analysis seem to be very promising, but suers
from signiant theoretial limitation, espeially in the world of Objet-Oriented Languages.
Convenient permission management, and proper resoure isolation in Java multi-appliation
systems are also a strong need on the road toward OSGi seurity.
The present study provides a pragmati approah to software seurity onerns, targeted
at the world of OSGi Platforms. It present an important step toward a better understanding
of OSGi-related seurity, and help pratitioners implement safer system by providing a
hardened OSGi prototype, SFelix v0.2. An important researh eort is still required to
provide an OSGi platform whih seurity mehanisms an be said to be omplete.
22
http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr/
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ure Systems - Building
Trustworthy Appliations, June 2005.
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A The OSGi platform
The OSGi Platform
23
[OSG05℄ is a omponentization layer to the Java Virtual Mahine. It
supports the runtime extension of Java-based appliation through a modular approah: the
appliations are parted into `bundles', that an be loaded, installed and managed indepen-
dently from eah other.
In this setion, we present rst an overview of the OSGi Platform, then the ore onept
of OSGi: the bundles and their Life Cyle, and the possible interations between bundles.
A.1 Overview
The OSGi Platform has been developed so as to support extensible Java-based systems in
resoure-onstraint systems, suh as automotive and mobile environments. It has sine then
spread into the world of Integrated Development Appliations (in partiular with Elipse),
and into appliative servers (IBM Websphere 6.1, Harmony, Cooon, Diretory...).
It runs as an overlay to the Java Virtual Mahine (JVM). The gure 13 shows the
overview of an OSGi-based system, with the Operating System (OS), the JVM, the platform
itself, and the bundles it ontains.
Figure 13: Overview of an OSGi Platform
Three main onepts sustain the OSGi platform: the platform, the bundle, and the
interoperability between the bundles. The Platform manages the appliations. The bundles
are the unit of deployment and exeution. The interoperability between the bundles is
ahieved at the lass level (aess to pakages from other bundles) and at the servie level
(aess to servies registered by other bundles).
A.2 The Bundles
An OSGi bundle is a Jar le [Sun03℄ whih is enhaned by spei meta-data. The typi-
al struture of a bundle is shown in the gure 14. The META-INF/MANIFEST.MF le
ontains the neessary OSGi meta-data: the bundle referene name (the `symboli name'),
its version, the dependenies and the provided resoures. Some pakages are exported, i.e.
23
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aessible from other bundles inside the platform. The ativator is used by the platform as
an initial bootstrap when the bundle is started. Pakages an be exported. Servies an be
registered, so as to be available for other bundles.
Figure 14: Intern Struture of an OSGi bundle
Eah bundle has a restrited view on the OSGi platform: the OSGi Context, whih is
transmitted to the bundle ativator at start time. This ontext referene is needed to publish
and look-up for servies. It also supports the aess to the management funtionalities of
the platform.
The OSGi bundles an also aess the Operating System of the mahine it is running on
through native libraries. This possibility is not spei to the OSGi environment, sine it
relies on the Java Runtime API, but it allows the bundles to break their isolation.
The Life Cyle of a bundle inside the OSGi Platform is dened as follows. The bundle
must rst be installed. When it is required to start, the pakage-level dependenies with
other bundles are resolved. When all dependenies are resolved, the bundle ativator is
launhed: the start() method is alled, and the related ode is exeuted. Typially, these
operations onsist in onguration and publiation of servies. The bundle is then in the
`started' state. Updating, stopping and uninstalling build the last possible operations for
bundle management The gure 15 shows the Life Cyle of a bundle inside a OSGi Platform.
A.3 Interations between Bundles
The interations between the bundles are done through two omplementary mehanisms:
the pakage export/import and the servie registration lookup faility. These mehanisms
are shown in the gure 16.
The publiation and lookup of servies are performed through the BundleContext refer-
ene that eah bundle reeives ar startup time. During the publiation proess, the adver-
tising bundles registers a servie by publishing a Java interfae it is implementing, and by
providing a lass implementing this interfae. The lookup is performed by the lient bundle,
whih gets the servie from the BundleContext and uses it as a standard Java objet.
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Figure 15: Life Cyle of an OSGi Bundles inside the platform
Figure 16: Interation Mehanisms between the OSGi Bundles
B Vulnerabilities List
The most ommon Vulnerability Lists presented in the setion 2.2 are given here.
B.1 The Lindqvist Classiation
The omputer seurity intrusions identied by Lindqvist [LJ97℄ are the following:
 external misuse (not tehnial),
 hardware misuse,
 masquerading,
 setting up subsequent misuse,
 bypassing intended ontrols,
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 ative misuse of resoure,
 passive misuse of resoure,
 misuse resulting from ination,
 use of an indiret aid in ommitting other misuse.
B.2 Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE)
The ategories dened in the Common Weaknesses Enumeration [MCJ05℄ are the following:
 Buer overows, format strings, et. [BUFF℄;
 Struture and Validity Problems;[SVM℄;
 Speial Elements [SPEC℄;
 Common Speial Element Manipulations[SPECM℄;
 Tehnology-Spei Speial Elements[SPECTS℄;
 Pathname Traversal and Equivalene Errors [PATH℄;
 Channel and Path Errors [CP℄;
 Information Management Errors [INFO℄;
 Rae Conditions [RACE℄;
 Permissions, Privileges, and ACLs [PPA℄;
 Handler Errors [HAND℄;
 User Interfae Errors [UI℄;
 Interation Errors [INT℄;
 Initialization and Cleanup Errors [INIT℄;
 Resoure Management Errors [RES℄;
 Numeri Errors [NUM℄;
 Authentiation Error [AUTHENT℄;
 Cryptographi errors [CRYPTO℄;
 Randomness and Preditability [RAND℄;
 Code Evaluation and Injetion [CODE℄;
 Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes [ERS℄;
 Insuient Veriation of Data [VER℄;
 Modiation of Assumed-Immutable Data [MAID℄;
 Produt-Embedded Maliious Code [MAL℄;
 Common Attak Mitigation Failures [ATTMIT℄;
 Containment errors (ontainer errors) [CONT℄;
 Misellaneous WIFFs [MISC℄.
B.3 Nineteen Dealy Sins
The 19 Deadly Sins dened by Howard [HLV05℄ are the following:
 buer overows,
 ommand injetion,
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 Cross-site sripting (XSS),
 format string problems,
 integer range error,
 SQL injetion,
 trusting network address information,
 failing to protet network tra,
 failing to store and protet data,
 failing to use ryptographially strong random numbers,
 improper le aess,
 improper use of SSL,
 use of weak password-based systems,
 unauthentiated key exhange,
 signal rae ondition,
 use of 'magi' URLs and hidden forms,
 failure to handle errors,
 poor usability,
 information leakage.
B.4 OWASP Top Ten
The OWASP Top Ten Vulnerability list for 2007 is the following
24
:
 Cross Site Sripting (XSS)
 Injetion Flaws
 Maliious File Exeution
 Inseure Diret Objet Referene
 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
 Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling
 Broken Authentiation and Session Management
 Inseure Cryptographi Storage
 Inseure Communiations
 Failure to Restrit URL Aess
B.5 Seven Kingdoms
The Seven Kingdoms dened by Gary MGraw [MG06℄ are the following. Note that eah
Kingdom ontains a ertain number of Phyla, that help give more preise hints so as the
atual vulnerabilities.
 Input Validation and representation,
 API abuse,
 Seurity Features,
24
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 Time and state,
 error handling,
 ode quality,
 enapsulation
 + environment
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C Formal Expression of the Vulnerability Pattern
This setion presents the Vulnerability Pattern in the Augmented Bakus Naur Form (BNF)
[CO05℄.
The urrent grammar is not meant to be losed: it reets the knowledge relative to
the onsidered vulnerabilities at a given time. It an be extended with additional attribute
values.
The atalog of the OSGi Maliious Bundles is referred as the `mb' atalog.
Vulnerability Referene
 VULNERABILITY_NAME ::= text
 IDENTIFIER ::= CATALOG_ID.SRC_REF.ID
with:
CATALOG_ID ::= mb
SRC_REF ::= arhive|java|native|osgi
ID ::= (0-9)*
 ORIGIN ::= text
 LOCATION ::= Bundle ( Arhive | Manifest | Ativator | Fragment ) | Appliation
Code - ( Native Code | Java ( Code | API ) | OSGi API )
 SOURCE ::= (ENTITY ( FUNCTIONNALITY | FLAW ;)+;)+
with ENTITY ::= OS | JVM - ( Runtime API | APIs )| OSGi Platform - (( Module |
Life-Cyle | Servie ) Layer | Bundle Repository Client )| Appliation Code
FUNCTIONNALITY ::= Kill utility | Value of Method Parameters | ( System.exit
| Runtime.halt ) method | Native Code Exeution | Thread API | Reetion API |
ClassLoader API | File API | Java Arhive | Bundle Management | Bundle Fragments
and:
FLAW ::= No Algorithm Safety - ( Java | Native Code )| Non OSGi R4-ompliant
Digital Signature Validation in the JVM | No Veriation of Bundle Arhive Validity
| No Chek of Size of Loaded Bundles | No Chek of Size of stored Data | No safe
Bundle Start | No Removal of Uninstalled Bundle Data | Bundle Meta-data Handling
- No Safe-Default | Unontrolled Servie Registration | Arhiteture of the Appliation
- No Validation of Servie Dependeny
 TARGET ::= Platform | OSGi Element - ( Platform Management Utility | Bundle |
Servie|Pakage )
 CONSEQUENCE_TYPE ::= ( Unavailability | Performane Breakdown | Undue A-
ess )( - ( Platform | Servie | Pakage )(, ( Platform | Servie | Pakage ))*)?
 INTRODUCTION_TIME ::= Platform Design or Implementation | Development |
Bundle Meta-data Generation | Bundle Digital Signature | Installation | Servie Pub-
liation or Resolution
 EXPLOIT_TIME ::= Download | Installation | Bundle Start | Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
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 DESCRIPTION ::= text
 PRECONDITIONS ::= text
 ATTACK_PROCESS ::= text
 CONSEQUENCE_DESCRIPTION ::= text
 SEE_ALSO ::= VULNERABILITY_NAME (, VULNERABILITY_NAME)*
Vulnerability Implementation
 CODE_REFERENCE ::= FILE_NAME
with FILE_NAME the name of a le, as dened by Unix File Names
 OSGI_PROFILE ::= CDC-1.0/Foundation-1.0 | OSGi/Minimum-1.1 | JRE-1.1 | J2SE-
1.2 | J2SE-1.3 | J2SE-1.4 | J2SE-1.5 | J2SE-1.6 | PersonalJava-1.1 | PersonalJava-1.2 |
CDC-1.0/PersonalBasis-1.0 | CDC-1.0/PersonalJava-1.0
 DATE ::= MONTH.DAY.YEAR
with MONTH ::= (1-12), DAY ::= (1-31), YEAR ::= (0-3000)
 TEST_COVERAGE ::= (0-100) %
 TESTED_ON ::= Osar | Felix | Knopersh | Equinox
Protetion
 EXISTING_MECHANISMS ::= Java Permissions | OSGi AdminPermission | SFelix
OSGi Seurity Layer | -
 ENFORCEMENT_POINT ::= Platform startup | Bundle Installation | -
 POTENTIAL_MECHANISMS ::= (POTENTIAL_MECHANISM_NAME (POTEN-
TIAL_MECHANISM_DESCR)?)+ with POTENTIAL_MECHANISM_NAME ::=
Code stati Analysis | OSGi Platform Modiation - ( Bundle Startup Proess | Instal-
lation Meta-data Handling | Servie Publiation )| Bundle size ontrol before down-
load | Servie-level dependeny validation | Resoure Control and Isolation - ( CPU |
Memory | Disk Spae )| Aess Control - FileSystem | Misellaneous | - and POTEN-
TIAL_MECHANISM_DESCR ::= text
 ATTACK_PREVENTION ::= Stop a ill-behaving thread | -
 REACTION ::= Uninstall the maliious bundle | Erase les | Stop the system proess
| Restart the platform | -
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D Vulnerability Catalog
D.1 Bundle Arhive
D.1.1 Invalid Digital Signature Validation
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Invalid Digital Signature Validation
 Identier: Mb.arhive.1
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Arhive
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (Non OSGi R4-ompliant Digital Signature
Validation in the JVM)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Bundle Digital Signature
 Exploit Time: Installation
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle whih signature is NOT ompliant to the OSGi R4 Digital
Signature is installed on the platform
 Preonditions: No Digital Signature Validation, or Digital Signature Validation Pro-
ess that relies on the Java JarFile API to perform the validation of the digital signa-
ture. The bundle signature must be non OSGi R4 ompliant in one of the following
ways: resoures have been removed from the arhive; resoures have been added; the
rst resoures in the arhive are NOT the Manifest File, the Signature File and the
Signature Blok le in this order (see [PF06℄).
 Attak Proess: Install a bundle with an invalid digital signature (see preonditions)
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: -
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: SFelix OSGi Seurity Layer
 Enforement Point: Bundle Installation
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: Uninstall the maliious bundle
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Bindex-resoureRemoved-1.0.jar, bindex-resouresAdded-1.0.jar,
bindex-unvalidResoureOrder-1.0.jar
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 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-04-25
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix
 Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
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D.1.2 Big Component Installer
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Big Component Installer
 Identier: Mb.arhive.2
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Arhive
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Bundle Repository Client (No Chek of Size of Loaded
Bundles)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Platform Design or Implementation
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: Remote installation of a bundle whih size is of similar to the available
devie memory
 Preonditions: OSGi platform running on a memory limited devie
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: Little memory is available for subsequent operations
 See Also: Big File Creator
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: OSGi AdminPermission
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Bundle size ontrol before download
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: -
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-02-20
 Test Coverage: 00%
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D.1.3 Deompression Bomb
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Deompression Bomb
 Identier: Mb.arhive.3
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Arhive
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No Veriation of Bundle Arhive Valid-
ity)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: The Bundle Arhive is a deompression Bomb (either a huge le made
of idential bytes, or a reursive arhive)
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: Provide a Bundle Arhive that is a deompression Bomb for instal-
lation (on a OBR, et.)
 Consequene Desription: Important onsumption of CPU or memory.
 See Also: -
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Startup Proess
(Chek that the Bundle is not a Deompression Bomb arhive)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.deompressionbomb-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-04-20
 Test Coverage: 50%
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D.2 Bundle Manifest
D.2.1 Dupliate Pakage Import
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Dupliate Pakage Import
 Identier: Mb.osgi.1
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Manifest
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Meta-data Handling - No Safe-
Default)
 Target: OSGi Element - Bundle
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Bundle Meta-data Generation
 Exploit Time: Installation
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A pakage is imported twie (or more) aording to manifest attribute
'Import-Pakage'. In the Felix and Knopersh OSGi implementations, the bundle
an not be installed
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: Exessive Size of Manifest File, Unvalid Ativator Meta-data, Erroneous
values of Manifest attributes, Insuient User Meta-data
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Installation Meta-data Han-
dling (ignore the repeated imports during OSGi metadata analysis)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.dupliateimport-0.1.ja
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-10-28
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Knopersh
 Known Robust Platforms: Equinox; Conierge; SFelix
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D.2.2 Exessive Size of Manifest File
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Exessive Size of Manifest File
 Identier: Mb.osgi.2
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Manifest
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Meta-data Handling - No Safe-
Default)
 Target: OSGi Element - Bundle
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Bundle Meta-data Generation
 Exploit Time: Installation
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle with a huge number of (similar) pakage imports (more than
1 Mbyte)
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: Insert a big number of imports in the manifest le of the bundle
 Consequene Desription: In the Felix and Knopersh implementations, the
launher proess takes a long time (several minutes) to parse the metadata le
 See Also: Dupliate Pakage Import, Unvalid Ativator Meta-data, Erroneous values
of Manifest attributes, Insuient User Meta-data
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Installation Meta-data Han-
dling (hek the size of manifest before the installation; more generally, hek the
format of the manifest size before the installation)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.hugemanifest-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-10-28
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Knopersh; Conierge
 Known Robust Platforms: SFelix; Equinox
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D.2.3 Erroneous values of Manifest attributes
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Erroneous values of Manifest attributes
 Identier: Mb.osgi.3
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Manifest
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Meta-data Handling - No Safe-
Default)
 Target: OSGi Element - Bundle
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Bundle Meta-data Generation
 Exploit Time: Installation
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle that provides false meta-data, in this example an non existent
bundle update loation
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: Set a false value for a given meta-data entry
 Consequene Desription: The ations that rely on the meta-data an not be
exeuted (here, no update possible)
 See Also: Dupliate Import, Exessive Size of Manifest File
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Installation Meta-data Han-
dling (hek the format of the manifest size before the installation, and provide failsafe
default)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.malformedupdateloation-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-10-28
 Test Coverage: 10%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.3 Bundle Ativator
D.3.1 Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop
 Extends: Innite Loop in Method Call
 Identier: Mb.osgi.4
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Ativator
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No safe Bundle Start)
 Target: OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown; Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Bundle Start
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: An innite loop is exeuted in the Bundle Ativator
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: An innite loop is exeuted in the Bundle Ativator
 Consequene Desription: Blok the OSGi Management entity (the felix, equinox
or knopersh shell; when launhed in the KF graphial interfae, the shell remain
available but the GUI is frozen). Beause of the innite loop, most CPU resoure is
onsumed
 See Also: CPU Load Injetion, Innite Loop in Method Call, Stand Alone Innite
Loop, Hanging Thread
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -
CPU ; OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Startup Proess (launh the bundle a-
tivator in a separate thread to prevent startup hanging)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.inniteloopinmethodall-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-24
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 Test Coverage: 10%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge
 Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
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D.3.2 Management Utility Freezing - Thread Hanging
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Management Utility Freezing - Thread Hanging
 Extends: Hanging Thread
 Identier: Mb.osgi.5
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Ativator
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No safe Bundle Start)
 Target: OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Bundle Start
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A hanging thread in the Bundle Ativator makes the management
utility freeze
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: Blok the OSGi Management entity (the felix, equinox
or knopersh shell; when launhed in the KF graphial interfae, the shell remain
available but the GUI is frozen).
 See Also: Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop, Hanging Thread
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Startup Proess
(launh the bundle ativator in a separate thread); Code stati Analysis
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.hangingthread-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.hangingthread2-
0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-24
 Test Coverage: 20%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge
 Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
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D.4 Bundle Code - Native
D.4.1 Runtime.exe.kill
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Runtime.exe.kill
 Identier: Mb.native.1
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Native Code
 Soure: OS (Kill utility); JVM - Runtime API (Native Code Exeution)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle that stops the exeution platform through an OS all
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or FilePermission `exeute' on the required
utilities (kill, ps, grep, ut)
 Attak Proess: Kill the OS proess whih orresponds to the exeution platform;
this proess is identied as far it is the parent proess of the proess in whih the
maliious sript is exeuted
 Consequene Desription: The shutdown hooks of the platforms arer exeuted
 See Also: System.exit, Runtime.halt, Reursive Thread Creation
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: Restart the platform
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.runtime_exe_kill-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-21
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.4.2 CPU Load Injetion
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: CPU Load Injetion
 Identier: Mb.native.2
 Origin: MOSGI, Ares researh projet
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Native Code
 Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Native Code); JVM - Runtime API
(Native Code Exeution)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A maliious bundle that onsumes 80% of the host CPU
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or RuntimePermission `loadLibrary'
 Attak Proess: Exeute a C all that onsume CPU by swithing between CPU-
intensive alulation and sleep time, aording to the speied ratio
 Consequene Desription: Most of the available CPU of the system is onsumed
artiially
 See Also: Memory Load Injetion, Ramping Memory Load Injetion, Innite Loop,
Stand-alone Innite Loop
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: Misellaneous (extension of the Java-Level seurity meha-
nisms to the native ode)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: Uninstall the maliious bundle
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.puloadinjetor-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-24
 Test Coverage: 00%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.5 Bundle Code - Java
D.5.1 System.exit
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: System.exit
 Identier: Mb.java.1
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - Runtime API (System.exit method)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle that stops the platform by alling 'System.exit(0)'
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or presene of the RuntimePermission `exitVM'
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: Runtime.halt, Exe.Kill, Reursive Thread Creation
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: Restart the platform
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.system_exit-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-11
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.5.2 Runtime.halt
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Runtime.halt
 Identier: Mb.java.2
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - Runtime API (Runtime.halt method)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle that stops the platform by alling 'Runtime.getRuntime.halt(0)'
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or RuntimePermission `exitVM'
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: The shutdown hooks are by-passed
 See Also: System.exit, Exe.Kill, Reursive Thread Creation
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: Restart the platform
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.runtime_halt-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-11
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.5.3 Reursive Thread Creation
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Reursive Thread Creation
 Identier: Mb.java.3
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - APIs (Thread API); Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: The exeution platform is brought to rash by the reation of an expo-
nential number of threads
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: Eah thread reated by the attak bundle reates three other
threads, and ontains a relatively small payload (a pdf le). An exessive number
of StakOverowErrors auses an OutOfMemoryError
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: System.exit, Runtime.halt, Exe.kill, Exponential Objet Creation
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: Stop the ill-behaving thread
 Reation: Restart the platform
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.exponentialthreadnumber-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-21
 Test Coverage: 50%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.5.4 Hanging Thread
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Hanging Thread
 Identier: Mb.java.4
 Origin: Java puzzlers 77, 85 [BG05℄
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - APIs (Thread API); Appliation Code (Value of Method Parameters)
 Target: OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: Thread that make the alling entity hang (servie, or pakage)
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: Use the Thread.sleep all with a large sleep duration to make the
exeution hang
 Consequene Desription: If the sleep all is performed in a synhronized blok,
the SIG_KILL (Ctrl+C) signal is aught by the platform
 See Also: Innite Startup Loop
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.hangingthread-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.hangingthread2-
0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-28
 Test Coverage: 20%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.5.5 Sleeping Bundle
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Sleeping Bundle
 Identier: Mb.java.5
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - APIs (Thread API)
 Target: OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A maliious bundle that goes to sleep during a speied amount of time
before having nished its job (experiene time is 50 se.)
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: Hanging Thread
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.sleepingbundle-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-28
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.5.6 Big File Creator
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Big File Creator
 Identier: Mb.java.6
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - APIs (File API)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A maliious bundle that reate a big (relative to available resoures)
les to onsume disk memory spae
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or FilePermission `write' to the maliious bundl
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: Big Bundle Installer
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: Resoure Control and Isolation - Disk Spae (per user/bundle);
Aess Control - FileSystem (Limit the aess to the FileSystem to the data diretory
of the bundle; ontrol the size of the data reated through the BundleContext)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: Erase les
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.biglereator-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-29
 Test Coverage: 00%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 63
D.5.7 Code Observer
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Code Observer
 Identier: Mb.java.7
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - APIs (Reetion API; ClassLoader API)
 Target: OSGi Element - Pakage; OSGi Element - Servie
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A omponent that observes the ontent of another one
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or ReetPermission
 Attak Proess: Use of the reetion API and the ClassLoader API
 Consequene Desription: Observation of the implementation of the published
pakages and servies, the lasses that are aggregated to these pakages and servies,
and lasses whih name are known (or guessed)
 See Also: Component Data Modier, Hidden Method Launher
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Privatelassspy/fr.inria.ares.servieabuser-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-02-12
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
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D.5.8 Component Data Modier
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Component Data Modier
 Extends: Code Observer
 Identier: Mb.java.8
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - APIs (Reetion API; ClassLoader API)
 Target: OSGi Element - Pakage; OSGi Element - Servie
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle that modies the data (i.e. the value of the attributes of the
lasses) of another one
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager or ReetPermission set; the name of the non-
exported modied lass must be known beforehand, and ontain a publi stati eld.
 Attak Proess: Use of the reetion API and the ClassLoader API to aess and
modify the value of attributes
 Consequene Desription: Modiation of the publi elds of the objets that are
aessible from another bundle (servie implementations, or objets that are attributes
of these servie implementations, or objets that are attributes of these latter objets,
...), or of the publi stati (non nal) elds of lasses whih name is known
 See Also: Code Observer, Hidden Method Launher
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Privatelassmanipulator/fr.inria.ares.servieabuser-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-02-12
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.5.9 Hidden Method Launher
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Hidden Method Launher
 Extends: Code Observer
 Identier: Mb.java.9
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: JVM - APIs (Reetion API; ClassLoader API)
 Target: OSGi Element - Pakage
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle that exeutes methods from lasses that are not exported
of provided as servie. All lasses that are referened (diretly or indiretly) as lass
attributes an be aessed. Only publi methods an be invoked
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or ReetPermission set
 Attak Proess: Use of the reetion API and the ClassLoader API to aess and
exeutes methods in lasses that are not exported by the bundle
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: Code Observer, Component Data Modier
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Hiddenlassexeutor/fr.inria.ares.servieabuser-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-02-12
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
RR n° 6231
66 Parrend & Frénot
D.5.10 Memory Load Injetion
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Memory Load Injetion
 Identier: Mb.java.10
 Origin: MOSGI Ares Researh Projet (OSGi Platform Monitoring)
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API
 Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A maliious bundle that onsumes most of available memory (61,65
MB in the example)
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: Store a huge amount of data in a byte array
 Consequene Desription: Only a limited memory spae is available for the exe-
ution of programs
 See Also: Ramping Memory Load Injetion, CPU Load Injetion
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -
Memory
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.memloadinjetor-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-24
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.5.11 Stand Alone Innite Loop
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Stand Alone Innite Loop
 Identier: Mb.java.11
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java Code
 Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A void loop in a lonesome thread that onsumes muh of the available
CPU
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: Innite loop launhed in an independent thread
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: Innite Startup Loop, CPU Load Injetion
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -
CPU
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.standaloneloop-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-09-22
 Test Coverage: 10%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
RR n° 6231
68 Parrend & Frénot
D.5.12 Innite Loop in Method Call
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Innite Loop in Method Call
 Identier: Mb.java.12
 Origin: Java puzzlers 26 to 33 [BG05℄
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java Code
 Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java)
 Target: Platform; OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown - Platform; Unavailability - Servie,
Pakage
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: An innite loop is exeuted in a method all (at lass use, pakage use)
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: An innite loop is exeuted in a method all
 Consequene Desription: Blok the alling entity (the alling lass or servie.
Beause of the innite loop, most CPU resoure is onsumed
 See Also: CPU Load Injetion, Stand-alone Innite Loop, Hanging Thread
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -
CPU
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.inniteloopinmethodall-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-08-24
 Test Coverage: 10%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 69
D.5.13 Exponential Objet Creation
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Exponential Objet Creation
 Identier: Mb.java.13
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java Code
 Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java)
 Target: OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: Objets are reated in a exponential way
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: A given objet reate in its onstrutor 3 instanes of objet of the
same lass
 Consequene Desription: The method all aborts with a 'StakOverowError'
 See Also: Reursive Thread Creation
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -
Memory
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.exponentialobjetreation-0.1
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-01-09
 Test Coverage: 50%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.6 Bundle Code - OSGi APi
D.6.1 Launh a Hidden Bundle
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Launh a Hidden Bundle
 Identier: Mb.osgi.6
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (Bundle Management); JVM - APIs (File
API)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle that launhes another bundle it ontains (the ontained bun-
dle ould be masqued as with a 'MyFile.java' le name)
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or OSGi PermissionAdmin and FilePermission
`write' for the maliious bundle
 Attak Proess: A bundle reates a new bundle on the le system, and launhes i
 Consequene Desription: A non foreseen bundle is installed. If install time hek-
ing exists (suh as digital signature), it passes through the veriation proess
 See Also: Pirat Bundle Manager
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: Uninstall the maliious bundle
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.silentloader-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.silentloader.onierge-
0.1.jar (without swing)
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-10-28
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.6.2 Pirat Bundle Manager
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Pirat Bundle Manager
 Identier: Mb.osgi.7
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (Bundle Management)
 Target: OSGi Element - Bundle
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A bundle that manages others without being requested to do so(here:
stops and starts the vitim bundle)
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or OSGi Permission Admin
 Attak Proess: The pirat bundle aesses to the bundle ontext, and then to its
vitim bundle
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: Launh Hidden Bundle
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.piratbundlemanager-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.piratbundlemanager.onierge-
0.1.jar (no swing)
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-10-30
 Test Coverage: 40%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.6.3 Zombie Data
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Zombie Data
 Identier: Mb.osgi.8
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No Removal of Uninstalled Bundle Data)
 Target: Platform
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: Data stored in the loal OSGi data store are not deleted when the
related bundle is uninstalled. It thus beomes unavailable and onsumes disks spae
(espeially on resoure onstraint devies)
 Preonditions: No SeuriyManager, or FilePermission set
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: -
 See Also: Big File Creator
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Uninstall Proess
(Delete Bundle Data when Bundles are uninstalled)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: Erase les
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.biglereator-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-04-20
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Conierge
 Known Robust Platforms: Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
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D.6.4 Cyle Between Servies
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Cyle Between Servies
 Identier: Mb.osgi.9
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Servie Layer (Arhiteture of the Appliation - No Valida-
tion of Servie Dependeny)
 Target: OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage
 Consequene Type: Unavailability
 Introdution Time: Servie Publiation or Resolution
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A yle exists in the servies all
 Preonditions: -
 Attak Proess: Servie 1 alls servie 2, whih alls servie 1. The attak an be
implemented as a fake 'servie 2', whih alls servie 1 bak instead of return properly
from the method that servie 1 alled
 Consequene Desription: `java.lang.StakOverowError', servie 1 an not be
exeuted
 See Also: -
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: -
 Enforement Point: -
 Potential Mehanisms: Servie-level dependeny validation
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.lientserver1-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.lientserver2-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2006-10-28
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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D.6.5 Numerous Servie Registration
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Numerous Servie Registration
 Identier: Mb.osgi.10
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Servie Layer (Unontrolled Servie Registration)
 Target: OSGi Element - Bundle; OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: Registration of a high number of (possibly idential) servies through
an loop
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or OSGi ServiePermission
 Attak Proess: Publish a given servie in a(n) (e.g. innite) loop
 Consequene Desription: Important duration of bundle stop
 See Also: -
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Servie Publiation (limita-
tion of the number of servies published in the framework)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.numerousservies-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-01-09
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge
 Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
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D.6.6 Freezing Numerous Servie Registration
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Freezing Numerous Servie Registration
 Identier: Mb.osgi.11
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Servie Layer (Unontrolled Servie Registration)
 Target: OSGi Element - Bundle; OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility
 Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: Registration of a high number of (possibly idential) servies through
an loop, in the Conierge OSGi Platform implementation
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or OSGi ServiePermission; exeution in the
Conierge OSGi Platform
 Attak Proess: Publish a given servie in a(n) (e.g. innite) loop
 Consequene Desription: The Platform almost totally freeze. OutOfMemory-
Errors are reported very frequently when the shell is used or when bundles perform
ations.
 See Also: -
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Servie Publiation (limita-
tion of the number of servies published in the framework)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.numerousservies-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-04-20
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Conierge
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D.7 Bundle Fragments
D.7.1 Exeute Hidden Classes
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Exeute Hidden Classes
 Identier: Mb.osgi.12
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Fragment
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Fragments)
 Target: OSGi Element - Pakage
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A fragment bundle exports a pkage that is not made visible by the
host. Other bundles an then exeute the lasses in this pakage
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or BundlePermission, `HOST' set to the host,
and BundlePermission, `FRAGMENT', set to the maliious fragment
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: Modiation of stati attributes, publiation of hidden
data or exeution of seret proedure; Conierge does not support fragment, and does
therefore not ontains this vulnerability
 See Also: Fragment Substitution, Aess Proteted Pakage through split Pakages
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Usehiddenlass/pakageexportfragment.jar
+ usehiddenlass/fr.inria.ares.fragmentaomplie-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-02-14
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
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D.7.2 Fragment Substitution
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Fragment Substitution
 Identier: Mb.osgi.13
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Fragment
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Fragments)
 Target: OSGi Element - Bundle
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A spei fragment bundle is replae by another, whih provides the
same lasses but with maliious implementation
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or BundlePermission `HOST' and `FRAG-
MENT' set to the required bundles, and OSGi AdminPermission set to the substitutor
bundle
 Attak Proess: A maliious bundles uninstalls the urrent fragment, and install a
maliious one (that is embedded in it) instead
 Consequene Desription: The host bundle exeutes a false implementations of
lasses provided by a fragment; Conierge does not support fragment, and does there-
fore not ontains this vulnerability
 See Also: Launh Hidden Bundle, Pirat Bundle Manager, Exeute Hidden Class,
Aess Proteted Pakage through split Pakages
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: -
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fragmentprovidespakagestohost/fr.inria.ares.fragmentsubstitutor
(has an embedded fragmentprovidespakagestohost/testfragmentlone bundle)
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-02-16
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
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D.7.3 Aess Proteted Pakage through split Pakages
Vulnerability Referene
 Vulnerability Name: Aess Proteted Pakage through split Pakages
 Identier: Mb.osgi.14
 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle'
 Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Fragment
 Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Fragments)
 Target: OSGi Element - Pakage
 Consequene Type: Undue Aess
 Introdution Time: Development
 Exploit Time: Exeution
Vulnerability Desription
 Desription: A pakage is built in the fragment, that have the same name than a
pakage in the host. All pakage-proteted lasses and methods an then be aessed
from the fragment, and through a proxy exported in the framework
 Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or BundlePermission `HOST' and `FRAG-
MENT' set to the suitable bundles
 Attak Proess: -
 Consequene Desription: Conierge does not support fragment, and does there-
fore not ontains this vulnerability
 See Also: Exeute Hidden Class, Fragment Substitution
Protetion
 Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions
 Enforement Point: Platform startup
 Potential Mehanisms: Misellaneous (the Java Arhive dened 'seal' keyword in
the Manifest File does not prevent the pakage to be ompleted by a split pakage in
the fragment. It probably should)
 Attak Prevention: -
 Reation: -
Vulnerability Implementation
 Code Referene: Fragmentsplitpakage/fr.inria.ares.testhostbundle-0.1.jar +
fragmentsplitpakage/testfragment-0.1.jar +
fragmentsplitpakage/fr.inria.ares.fragmentlient-0.1.jar
 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5
 Date: 2007-02-17
 Test Coverage: 100%
 Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
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E Attak Implementations
The implementations of the presented attaks are given. Two types of attaks an be per-
formed through several dierent implementations.
E.1 Innite Loops
The various implementations of Innites Loops in Java are given. They math the Vulner-
ability mb.java.8 and mb.java.12 in our atalog.
E.1.1 First Option
boolean ondition==true;
While(ondition);
E.1.2 Seond Option
This implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #26 [BG05℄.
publi stati final int END = Integer.MAX\_VALUE;
publi stati final int START = END - 100; // or any other start value
for (int i = START; i <= END; i++);
E.1.3 Third Option
This implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #27 [BG05℄.
int i = 0;
while (-1 << i != 0)
{i++;}
E.1.4 Fourth Option
This implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #28 [BG05℄.
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double i = 1.0/0.0; //an also be set to Double.POSITIVE\_INFINITY,
//or a suffiiently big number (suh as 1.0e17 or bigger)
while (i == i + 1);
E.1.5 Fifth Option
This implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #45 [BG05℄.
publi stati void main(String[℄ args) {
workHard();
}
private stati void workHard() {
try {
workHard();
} finally {
workHard();
}
}
E.1.6 Other Implementations
For further implementation of the innite loop, you an also refer to
 the Java Puzzler #29 (double i = Double.NaN;while(i! =i);),
 the Java Puzzler #30 (String i = a; while (i != i + 0)), puzzler 31 ( short i = -1;
while (i != 0) i >= 1;),
 the Java Puzzler #32 (Integer i = new Integer(0); Integer j = new Integer(0); while (i
<= j && j <= i && i != j);),
 the Java Puzzler #33 (int i = Integer.MIN_VALUE; while (i != 0 && i == -i);(//or
long i = Long.MIN_VALUE), for() loop with unsuitable modiation of the variables
that intervene in the stop ondition).
E.2 Hanging Thread
The various implementations of Hanging Threads in Java are given. They math the Vul-
nerability mb.java.9 in our atalog.
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E.2.1 First Option
This implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #77 [BG05℄.
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import java.util.Timer;
import java.util.TimerTask;
publi lass Stopper extends Thread{
private volatile boolean quittingTime = false;
publi void run() {
while (!quittingTime)
pretendToWork();
System.out.println(``Beer is good'');
}
private void pretendToWork() {
try {
Thread.sleep(300); // Sleeping on the job?
} ath (InterruptedExeption ex) { }
}
// It's quitting time, wait for worker - Called by good boss
synhronized void quit() throws InterruptedExeption {
quittingTime = true;
join();
}
// Resind quitting time - Called by evil boss
synhronized void keepWorking() {
quittingTime = false;
}
publi void hang(){
System.out.println(``HangingThread Stopper ready''
+``to behave badly'');
try
{
final Stopper worker = new Stopper();
worker.start();
Timer t = new Timer(true); // Daemon thread
t.shedule(new TimerTask() {
publi void run() { worker.keepWorking(); }
}, 500);
Thread.sleep(400);
worker.quit();
}
ath( InterruptedExeption e)
{
e.printStakTrae();
}
}
}
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E.2.2 Seond Option
This implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #85 [BG05℄.
stati {
Thread t = new Thread(new Runnable() {
publi void run() {
initialized = true;
}
});
t.start();
try {
t.join();
} ath(InterruptedExeption e) {
throw new AssertionError(e);
}
}
E.2.3 Other Implementations
For other implementations, see the JLint Manual
25
for `deadlok errors' (2 ourrenes).
25
http://artho.om/jlint/manual.html
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F XML2Tex Doumentation Generator
To ease the validation of the Vulnerability Patterns and the generation of the atalog, we
developed a small tool based on XML tehnologies, XML2Tex. The overall proess of the
XML2tex Doumentation Generation proess is given in Figure 17.
Figure 17 presents the overview of the XML2tex Doumentation Generation proess.
Figure 17: XML2Tex Proess
First, the vulnerability pattern is heked against a referene XML Shema (XSD). Se-
ondly, its is transformed into an XML report through XSL transformations. An XML Report
is a spei XML le whih is easily mappable to doumentation: its ontains in partiular a
title, paragraphs, and so on. Thirdly, the XML report is transformed into a Tex le through
an Ad-Ho parser named Report2Tex.
The validity of the Vulnerability Patterns of the atalog is guaranteed by their validation
against the formal expression of the Pattern given in the appendix C. The well-formedness
of the XML Report and of the Tex le are ensures by the suessive parsers.
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